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The Trilemma of Legitimacy
Multilevel Governance in the EU and the
Problem of Democracy
I. Introduction
 „Hence a form of government has been found which is nei-
ther precisely national nor federal; (...) and the new word to
express this new thing does not yet exist“ (de Tocqueville)
As the European Communities have unquestionably been exercising
govermental power for many years, there is a need for democratic legiti-
mation of this specific „Governance without Statehood“
1. To a far greater
extent than ordinary international organizations, the European Union has
crossed the boundary from horizontal interstate cooperation to vertical
policy-making in a dynamic multi-level system, in which the member
states are but one level of the polity
2. The European Union has developed
                                        
1 Wallace, William: Governance without Statehood. The Unstable Equilibrium, in:
Wallace, Helen/Wallace, William (ed.): Policy-Making in the European Union, 3rd
edition, Oxford 1996, pp. 439-460.
2 Jachtenfuchs, Markus: Democracy and Governance in the European Union, in:
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into a new type of political system which lacks many of the features we
associate with democratic governance. Whereas in the past the EC relied
on indirect legitimacy based on its member states and their complete con-
trol of European policy-making, the „uneven denationalization“
3 evoked
by the European integration indicates that the sovereign state cannot re-
main the sole focus of normative reflection. Since the Single European
Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the forced transfer
of political decisions and allocations from the national to the European
level has weakened democratic influence and control at the national level
without having been compensated by equally strong democratic institu-
tions and processes at the European level. Therefore, the European Union
is a new subject for theories of legitimacy which poses fundamental ques-
tions to the established principles and concepts of democratic theory. In
this discussion paper I try to develop an argument why neither politicians
nor academics still have not found any satisfactory solutions concerning
the legitimacy problem of European Governance.
First, I will give an overview of the main sources of legitimacy in the
Euro-Polity (II.). It will be shown that the strict observation of formal
rules of democracy at the European level is not the sole method in which
multi-level governance in the EU might gain legitimacy. Regardless of
this assumption, it is obvious that European policy-making suffers from a
democratic deficit which must be taken seriously from a normative point
of view. The academic debate about this democratic deficit is centered on
the two dimensions of the problem, which will be presented in chapter III.
On the one hand, the institutional arrangement of the EU often is inter-
preted as non-democratic. On the other hand, it is argued that the EU is
unable to be a ‘real’ democracy in principle because the structural and
social prerequisites on which democratic rule depends are missing at the
European level. These are the main challenges for European constitutional
                                        
3 Zürn, Michael: Jenseits der Staatlichkeit. Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen
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engineering. The final part (IV.) consists of a discussion of varying re-
form options dealing with the multidimensional legitimacy problem.
II. Sources of Legitimacy in the European
Multi-Level-System
One of the key questions for many political theorists is how the will of the
European ‘Demoi’ can be implemented better in the decision-making pro-
cess of the European Union
4. Therefore, the debate about the legitimate
order in Europe is still mainly focused on the European Parliament, which
is the only directly elected and therefore publicly accountable EU-
institution. Although the Parliament plays only a subordinate role in
European policy-making, it seems to be predestined to be the main bearer
of legitimacy in the Union. Indeed, the European Parliament is the only
body at the European level which is able to claim legitimacy through the
democratic participation of the electorate due to the holding of direct
European-wide elections. Following a simple logic, the enhancing of the
legislative powers of the European Parliament is the most convincing rec-
ommendation for resolving the European Union’s legitimacy problem.
But sometimes problems are much more complicated than they appear to
be at first sight. When calling for a more adequate legitimation of the
European „Multi-Level Governance“
5, we must bear in mind that demo-
cratic mechanisms at the European level are only one of several ways in
which the EU might gain legitimacy. The current academic debate, there-
fore, „is deficient since it focuses exclusively on the weakness of the in-
                                        
4 See only Pogge, Thomas W.: How to Create Supra-National Institutions Democra-
tically. Some Reflections on the European Union’s ‘Democratic Deficit, in: Folles-
dal/Koslowski, Democracy and the European Union, ibid., pp. 160-185.
5 Marks, Gary: Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, in: Cafruny,
Alan W./Rosenthal, Glenda G. (ed.): The State of the European Community, vol.
2, Boulder 1993, pp. 391-411; Bulmer, Simon: The Governance of the European
Union. A New Institutionalist Approach, in: Journal of Public Policy 4 (1994), pp.
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put structures at the level of the European Union“
6. It is not simply a
matter of the EU having a so-called ‘democratic deficit’, which must be
corrected by giving greater powers to the European Parliament. There are
two other important sources of legitimacy in the multi-layered European
system which have to be taken into account when considering the legiti-
macy problems of multi-level governance in Europe:
• Firstly, its general efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with political
problems - the technocratic and utilitarian justification
7 for European
Governance („output“-legitimacy). The underlying assumption here is
that the legitimacy of a political system depends on its capacity to
achieve the citizens’ goals and to solve their problems. Multi-Level-
Governance in the European Union could be seen as ‘government for
the people’ - it is legitimate and even democratic insofar as the output
of the political system corresponds „fully to the collective preferences
of its citizens“
8. This legitimizing factor has a long tradition in the
history of European integration. The Union enjoys utilitarian support
through the appeal to the economic welfare which it may provide.
Surely it cannot be supposed that all human behaviour can be ex-
plained by economic motives, but experience in European integration
has shown that peoples can be won over by favourable economic con-
ditions. Following the neofunctionalist theory of European integra-
tion
9, the pursuit of different shared sectional benefits promote a
patchwork quilt of support. Indeed, more and more economic and po-
litical elites transfered their loyalities and expectations to the new
‘central’ institutions of the European Union as the increase of EU-
                                        
6 Scharpf, Fritz W.: Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State, in:
Journal of European Public Policy 4 (1997), pp. 18-36, p. 19.
7 von Bogdandy, Armin: Supranationale Union als neuer Herrschaftstypus: Enstaatli-
chung und Vergemeinschaftung aus staatstheoretischer Perspektive, in: integration
16 (1993), pp. 210-224, p. 220.
8 Dahl, Robert A./Tufte, Edward R.: Size and Democracy, Stanford 1973, p. 20.
9 Haas, Ernst B.: The Uniting of Europe, Stanford 1958, p. 16.The Trilemma of Legitimacy
7
Lobbying
10 and the public demands for European solutions show. The
success of the European enterprise, and therefore its justification, de-
pends on its utility in providing substantive results for the participating
countries and their populations. As long as the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of European policy-making leads to more noticeable benefits
than costs the utilitarian support of large parts of the European popu-
lation and hence the membership in the Community is less likely to be
questioned.
• Secondly, the democratic and formal legitimacy of the European Un-
ion is still founded indirectly by member states as signatories to the
treaties, and by their parliaments. The constitutionalization of Europe
was approved by all national parliaments of the member states. It is
argued that the „formal legitimacy“ of this system could be taken for
granted because in the creation of the European institutions all re-
quirements of the law are oberserved
11. Indeed, in this formal sense,
the existing structures and processes of multi-level governance rest on
a formal approval by the democratically elected parliaments of the
member states. At the same time, governance at the European level
suffers from a clear democratic deficit. Therefore, as far as European
Governance is the result of interstate bargaining, it is indispensable
that national governments acting in the European arena are democrati-
cally controlled by, and held accountable to, their national constituen-
cies and parliaments. As the German Constitutional Court points out,
it is first and foremost the national peoples of the member states who
have to provide the democratic legitimation for Union Governance. In
the „Staatenverbund“ formed by the EU, democratic legitimation nec-
essarily comes about through the feedback of the actions of the Euro-
                                        
10 Andersen, Svein S./Eliassen, Kjell A.: EU-Lobbying. Between Representativity
and Effectiveness, in: Andersen, Svein S./Eliassen Kjell A. (ed.): The European
Union: How Democratic Is It?, London 1996, pp. 41-55.
11 Weiler, Joseph H. H.: After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Eu-
rope, in: Adams, William James (ed.): Singular Europe. Economy and Polity of
the European Community after 1992, Michigan 1993, pp. 11-41, p. 19.Marcus Höreth
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pean institutions into the parliaments of the member-states
12. The
„Rule of law“
13 is another legitimizing factor which guarantees that the
Union has no direct means of enforcing its authority - it has neither a
police nor an army - but only a small administrative machine which
must rely to a large extent on the member states.
The different sources of legitimacy stem from the hermaphrodite „nature
of the beast“
14 called ‘European Union’. The current state of the Euro-
pean integration is often described as a complex „mixed polity“
15 which
has classical intergovernmental elements as well as increasing suprana-
tional components. Therefore, the Euro-Polity divides political authority
among several levels of governance and includes a multitude of different
sources of legitimacy. Usually a twofold policy legitimacy of the Union is
noticed. On the one hand, national, indirect legitimacy is conferred to the
Council via governments enjoying the trust of their parliaments. On the
other hand, legitimacy arises from direct democratic foundation expressed
by the European Parliament. These sources of legitimacy are described as
the two pillars on which the Community’s institutional system rest
16.
This constellation is a new one. Until middle of the eighties, the European
Community was not more than a „funktionaler Zweckverband“
17 which
could be sufficiently legitimised only by the member states and their par-
                                        
12 Bundesverfassungsgericht: Urteil zum Maastricht-Vertrag, in: Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts 89 (1994), pp. 155-213, p. 155.
13 Hallstein, Walter: Europe in the Making, London 1972, p. 30.
14 Risse-Kappen, Thomas: Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations
Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union, in: Journal of
Common Market Studies 34 (1996), pp. 55-80.
15 Wessels, Wolfgang: The Modern West European State and the European Union:
Democratic Erosion or a New Kind of Polity?, in: Andersen/Eliasen, The Europe-
an Union, ibid., pp. 57-69, p. 59.
16 Dehousse, Renaud: Institutional Reform in the European Community: Are there
Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue?, European University Institute Working
Paper RSC 95/4, Florence 1995, p. 23.
17 Ipsen, Hans Peter: Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tübingen 1972.The Trilemma of Legitimacy
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liaments, while the weakness of the European Parliament could be ne-
glected at that time. In addition, the principle „rule of law“ has secured
that the Community was unable to act autonomously against the interests
of their member states and their populations. The question of legitimacy
did not arise because the EC was the ‘right’ reaction against the commu-
nist threat and based „on the democratic traditions and practices of its
members“
18. As long as the Community was successful in solving the
limited problems of a few policy sectors which required European solu-
tions, the integration process was not open to question. Consensual coop-
eration at the European level was widely held to leave the democratic le-
gitimacy at the national level intact
19.
After the great leap forward through the SEA and TEU, several new pol-
icy sectors have been „Europeanized“. Policies which are supposed to
belong to the core of state sovereignity have been put on the European
agenda. In the near future, currency will come under supranational
authority. Since the European Union could be defined as a partial polity
which tends to redefine political boundaries
20 and which developed into a
form of direct governance in its own right, the questions concerning the
political identity, loyality and affilitation attached to the Union level of
governance have become crucial
21. Under these circumstances it was in-
creasingly obvious that the Europeanization of policy-making could no
longer be based mainly on indirect legitimacy: „The more power over
issues of core state sovereignity and redistribution was transferred to the
European level, the more the Community was in need of its own sources
                                        
18 Wallace, Helen: Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy for the EC, in:
Garcia, Soledad (ed.): European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, London
1993, pp. 95-105, p. 96.
19 Scharpf, Fritz W.: Legitimationsprobleme der Globalisierung. Regieren in Ver-
handlungssystemen, in: Böhret, Carl/Wewer, Göttrik (ed.): Regieren im 21. Jahr-
hundert. Zwischen Globalisierung und Regionalisierung, Opladen 1993, pp. 165-
185, p. 180.
20 Weiler, After Maastricht, ibid., p. 18.
21 Wallace, Deepening and Widening, ibid., p. 100.Marcus Höreth
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of direct popular support“
22. But the long assumed „permissive consen-
sus“ of the European population towards integration and the postulated
pure „utilitarian support“ has eroded and turned into widespread mistrust
since „Maastricht“. The dissatisfaction and disagreement with some pol-
icy outputs resulted in citizens’ withdrawing their support from the EU as
a whole
23. The nature of the Union as ‘Community of Law’ was no longer
suitable for legitimizing Euro-politics because „(...) appeals to the law
can never provide more than a primary, and therefore provisional, ground
for legitimacy. Rules cannot justify themselves simply by being rules, but
require justification by reference to considerations beyond themselves“
24.
This new scepticism by both public opinion and the scientific community
entailed a great debate about the legitimate order of the European Union
which has been continued until today. The decided enlargement of the EU
will intensify the problem of legitimate rule in the multi-level system.
During the ongoing post-Maastricht controversy, the so-called „demo-
cratic deficit“ has been identified as the main challenge for legitimate
European Governance.
III. Dimensions of the Democratic Deficit
1. The non-democratic Character of the Institutional Arrangement
In the existing stage of European Integration the statal structures, proc-
esses and institutions cannot provide adequate democratic quality for the
European Union. One of the most important principles of democracy - the
                                        
22 Schimmelfennig, Frank: Legitimate Rule in the European Union. The Academic
Debate, Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensfor-
schung, No. 27, Tübingen 1996, p. 2.
23 Reif, Karl-Heinz: Ein Ende des ‘permissive consensus’? Zum Wandel europapoliti-
scher Einstellungen in der öffentlichen Meinung der EG-Mitgliedstaaten, in:
Hrbek, Rudolf (ed.): Der Vertrag von Maastricht in der wissenschaftlichen Kon-
troverse, Baden-Baden 1993, pp. 23-40.
24 Obradovic, Daniela: Policy Legitimacy and the European Union, in: Journal of
Common Market Studies 34 (1996), pp. 191-221, p. 197.The Trilemma of Legitimacy
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„inclusiveness of citizenship“
25 - is hardly fulfilled. When considering the
institutional dimension of the democratic deficit the following problems
usually are addressed:
• Even after Maastricht and Amsterdam, the powers of the European
Parliament in the legislative process leave a huge gap in democratic
control for European policy-making. Although the IGC in Amsterdam
has brought some progress in strengthening the role of the European
Parliament, the really important decisions do not occur there. The
voice of the European Parliament remains limited and its power to
shape Union’s legislation indirect. „Even though the European Parlia-
ment’s power over the Commission has been considerably enhanced by
the Maastricht Treaty, it largely remains an outsider in comitology
networks“
26. At the same time, the European Parliament has not
emerged as a forum in which political debate on important issues can
be developed. In such circumstances, the Parliament is also not the
adequate ‘counterweight’ to the Council of Ministers, representing the
executive branch in the member states, which continues to enjoy pri-
macy in the Community legislative process. For this reason, govern-
ance in the Union is still predominantly the result of net empowerment
of the executives of the member states without meaningful parliamen-
tary control at the European level. In addition to the Parliament’s
weakness in the process of policy formation and democratic control, it
is not constituted as a real representative body of the European citizen,
because the democratic principle „parity of votes“ („one man - one
                                        
25 Boyce, Brigitte: The Democratic Deficit of the European Community, in: Parlia-
mentary Affairs 46 (1993), pp. 458-478, p. 459.
26 Dehousse, Renaud: European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parlia-
mentary System or Regulatory Structure?, RSC Working Paper, No. 98/11, Euro-
pean University Institute Florence 1998, p. 10.Marcus Höreth
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vote“) is not even nearly fulfilled
27. In sum, it simply does not possess
the functions of a ‘true’ parliament.
• The critics of the institutional arrangement of the EU often emphasize
the bureaucratic and technocratic character of the Commission. De
Gaule’s famous dictum of the Commission as „aréopague apatride,
technocratique, et irresponsable“ has many advocates even today. In-
deed, the Commission is the body which fits least easily with tradi-
tional democratic theory. The very control of the legislative agenda
gives the Commission the power to set priorities for the Community
28.
This undemocratic body is exercising powers of a kind normally re-
served to elected institutions. Although it has many functions compa-
rable to a ‘real’ government it is not democratically legitimate in the
same way. The Commission depends more on the approval of the
member states
29 and less on the European Parliament whereas national
governments depend exclusively on their parliaments. The intrinsic
set-up of multilevel administrative interpenetration coordinated by the
Commission is responsible for the often criticized bureaucratization of
‘Brüssels’
30. For this reason the Commissioners are sometimes called
modern ‘Platonic guardians’, which, of course, is unsuitable for justi-
fying their powers.
• The role of the Council of Minsters in providing indirect legitimacy
for the European Union is weakening for two reasons. Firstly, supra-
                                        
27  Steffani, Winfried: Das Demokratie-Dilemma der Europäischen Union. Die Rolle
der Parlamente nach dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in: Steffani, Win-
fried/Thaysen, Uwe (ed.): Demokratie in Europa. Zur Rolle der Parlamente, Opla-
den 1995, pp. 33-49.
28 Craig, P.P.: Democracy and Rule-Making Within the EC: An Empirical and Nor-
mative Assessment, in: European Law Journal 3 (1997), pp. 105-130, p. 117.
29 Matláry, Janne Haaland: Democratic Legitimacy and the Role of the Commission,
in: Follesdal/Koslowski, Democracy and the European Union, ibid., pp. 65-80.
30 Wessels, Wolfgang: An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on
Integration Processes, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 35 (1997), pp. 267-
299, p. 281.The Trilemma of Legitimacy
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national institutions obtained more power and independence in order to
complete the single market project which lead to the decline of the
member state’s ability to control every step in European decision-
making. For that reason alone, the state is a declining source of politi-
cal legitimation in the European multi-level system
31. Secondly, deci-
sion-making processes at the European level lead to manifold „scape-
goating“ and „credit claiming“ in European policy-making
32. In the
course of enlarging the competencies of the Union, the member states
comfort themselves with the conviction that they would still be able to
control actual decisions in the Council. A paradox is noticable: On the
one hand, the national executives want to give the impression that they
are playing the very active and determinant part in formulating and
controlling European policy-making. But the ‘package deals’, which
are usually concluded by the Council, often water down the original
negotiating position of the member state executives which is mandated
by the national constituencies and parliaments. On the other hand, the
member state executives seem to play only a passive role in the two-
level game when calling for unrealistic European solutions. It could be
said that member state governments often hide behind „Brussels“
while they are not willing or able to do their homework in domestic
politics. The result of this scapegoating - but this is also the case with
‘credit claiming’ - is a benevolent diffusion of responsibility and ac-
countability in the multi-level system, because the public no longer
knows who is the right addressee for political demands. This is also a
reason why the indirect legitimation of Euro-politics granted by the
council is an eroding source of legitimacy. It should be mentioned that
this development has negative implications for the national democra-
                                        
31 Matláry, Janne Haaland: New Forms of Governance in Europe? The Decline of the
State as the Source of Political Legitimation, in: Cooperation and Conflict 30
(1995), pp. 99-123.
32 Moravcsik, Andrew: Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Dome-
stic Politics and International Cooperation, Harvard University Working Paper Se-
ries, No. 52, Cambridge, Mass. 1994.Marcus Höreth
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cies, too: „There is no longer any question that European democracies
dicredit themselves when, for an evergrowing number of urgent prob-
lems, national political leaders admit their importance by calling for
‘European solutions’, while in Brussels interminable negotiations will,
at best, lead to compromises that are declared unsatisfactory by all
concerned, and for which nobody is willing to assume political respon-
sibility“
33.
2. The Missing Structural Prerequisites for a European Democracy
There are many deep-rooted arguments which speak against the European
Union’s general ability to be a real ‘textbook-friendly’ democracy. The
current debate concerning the structural and social prerequisites for a
European-wide democracy is predominantly focused on four broader is-
sues:
• One of the most discussed obstacles to a forced democratization, espe-
cially in the German literature
34, is the non-existence of a european-
wide people. Indeed, the crucial question is if there can be „ (...) a
democratization at the European level without there being a transcen-
dent notion of a European people? Is there a European demos around
which, by which, a democracy can be established? How should or
could it be defined? How could or should it fit into political the-
ory?“
35. A ‘Demos’ of course need not be an ‘Ethnos’ as well. But the
members of a ‘Demos’ must be identical in the sense of recognizing
each other as members of the same political community. Only under
these circumstandes, is the use of the majority principle for all mem-
                                        
33 Scharpf, Fritz W.: Community and Autonomy: Multi-level Policy-Making in the
European Union, in: Journal of European Public Policy 1 (1994), pp. 219-242, p.
220.
34 See only von Simson, Werner: Was heißt in einer europäischen Verfassung „Das
Volk“?, in: Europarecht 1991, pp. 1-15.
35 Weiler, Joseph H.H.: European Democracy and Its Critique, in: West European
Politics 2 (1995), pp. 4-40, p. 5.The Trilemma of Legitimacy
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bers in a democracy acceptable. Kielmansegg
36 has shown that the ac-
ceptance of the majority principle presupposes the existence of a com-
munity of communication, of memory, and of experience. The mem-
ber states of the Union do not constitute such a community of commu-
nication
37. To a very limited extent only they form a community of ex-
perience and shared history. But again this common European history
is differently interpreted alongside national categories of identity. Jo-
seph Weiler has demonstrated the strength of this ‘no-demos’ argument
by constructing an interesting intellectual experiment. He suggests the
entry of the Kingdom of Denmark into the Federal Republic of Ger-
many as a seventeenth „Bundesland“: „Try and tell the Danes that
they should not worry since they will have full representation in the
Bundestag. Their screams of grief will be shrill not simply because
they will be condemned, as Danes, to permanent minorityship (that
may be true for the German Greens too), but because the way nation-
ality, in this way of thinking, enmeshes with democracy is that even
majority rule is only legitimate within a demos, when Danes rule
Danes“
38. The rigorous implication of this view is simply that in the
absence of a European demos there cannot be a democracy at the
European level.
• It is often argued that the extent of cultural and social heterogeneity in
Europe prevents majority-rule at the European level, within the Euro-
pean Council as well as in the European Parliament. This argument is
closely related to the ‘no-demos’-thesis. In this view, democratic gov-
ernance requires more homogeneity in ethnic, linguistic, cultural and
institutional spheres. But this argument is not entirely convincing, in-
                                        
36 Kielmansegg, Peter Graf: Integration und Demokratie, in: Jachtenfuchs, Mar-
kus/Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.): Europäische Integration, Opladen 1996, pp. 47-71,
p. 57.
37 Risse, Thomas: Who are We? A Europeanization of National Identities? Un-
published Paper, European University Institute, Florence 1997.
38 Weiler, Joseph H.H.: The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, in: Journal
of Common Market Studies 35 (1997), pp. 97-131, p. 116.Marcus Höreth
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deed it is rather dubious: „Whereas different writers throw a different
mix of elements into the pot, an insistence on a relatively high degree
of homogeneity, measured by these ethno-cultural criteria, is typically
an important, indeed critical, element of the discourse. Here rests, of
course, the most delicate aspect of the theory since the insistence on
homogeneity is what conditions in its statal operationalisation the rules
for inclusion and exclusion“
39.
• Some authors point out that there is a European-wide lack of interme-
diary structures which are necessary preconditions in order to integrate
different political, economic and social interests into the political proc-
ess of a democracy
40. In the member states political parties and the
media-based public are the most important factors to mediate beween
decision-makers and citizens. It is obvious that there is no European
public and no European party-system. Political events in the EU
monitored by the media are mostly perceived from a pure national per-
spective. The media as mediator between government and population
sets the agenda for the European integration matters which are decisive
in national elections. It is nearly impossible to organize wide, general
discussions on European issues at the European level, because a ma-
jority of people cannot participate in or follow public debates in a for-
eign language. Expectations of the development of a European party
system on the occasion of the first direct elections to the European
Parliament were dissapointed
41. Even parties with a great international
tradition like the Social Democrats have great difficulties in agreeing
to minimal common programmatic European guidelines. The parties
                                        
39 Weiler, European Democracy and Its Critique, ibid., p. 11.
40 See only Merkel, Wolfgang: Integration and Democracy in the European Commu-
nity. The Contours of a Dilemma, Instituto Juan March de estudios e investigacio-
nes, Estudio 42/1993, Madrid 1993.; Merkel, Wolfgang: Das Demokratie-
Effizienz-Dilemma. Die Europäische Union gerät in eine Legitimitätsfalle, in:
FAZ, 24 April 1996, p. 12.
41 Hix, S.: Parties at the European Level and the Legitimacy of EU Socio-economic
Policy, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 33 (1995), pp. 527-554.The Trilemma of Legitimacy
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follow only the imperatives of the national political game because their
organizational and electoral basis remain within the member states. It
is not easy for party federations to play the multilevel game because it
is nearly impossible to link both arenas effectively. In sum there are no
insitutions at the European level which are able to transform even
complicated issues into distinguishable alternatives for decision along
clearly defined conflict lines
42. This leads to a situation in which no
one who votes in the European elections has the persuasion that his
voice affects critical policy choices at the European level or has an in-
fluence in confirming or rejecting European governance. It is simply
not possible for the electorate to replace one set of governers by an-
other in „throwing the scoundrals out“, which is one of the most im-
portant principles in democratic theory. The lack of transparency of
the European „Politikverflechtung“
43 increases the impossibility of
sanctioning any single person or party for a positive or negative per-
formance. As a result, the European elections are only second-order
elections, in which the outcomes are determined more by domestic po-
litical allegiances and less by attitudes towards European matters.
Moreover, interest groups and social movements predominantly are
organized in the national context and are not easliy to be europeanized.
European umbrella associations have a very limited capacity for action
because the decision-making processes at the European level are very
complicated and the heterogeneity of the different acteurs playing in
the European arena is much stronger than it is in the national context
44.
Whereas large enterprises and the political executives are able to act
effectively on the European level this is not the case for social move-
                                        
42 Jachtenfuchs, Democracy and Governance in the European Union, ibid., p. 48.
43 The thesis of the „joint decision trap“ was first developed by Fritz Scharpf: Die
Politikverflechtungsfalle. Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im
Vergleich, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 26 (1985), pp. 323-356.
44 Jachtenfuchs, Democracy and Governance in the European Union, ibid., p. 44.Marcus Höreth
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ments, trade unions and for many interest groups (especially with ‘dif-
fuse’ interests).
• The most clear argument against the democratic capability of the EU is
perhaps the most decisive: it is the size of a supposed European de-
mocracy. Even if governance in the European Union is organized by
the same institutional arrangement which can be found in the member
states, there would be a decrease in the political weight and in the level
of control of each individual within this new political boundaries. As
Joseph Weiler points out: „That is (...) an inevitable result of enlarg-
ing the membership of the functional polity (...) and from adding a tier
of government thereby distancing it further from its ultimate subjects
in whose name and for whom democratic government is supposed to
operate“
45.
IV. Constitutional Choices and Reform Options
„The piecemeal engineer will adopt the method of searching
for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of
society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest
ultimate good“ (Karl Popper)
Against the background of the multidimensional democracy problem we
begin to perceive the contours of a legitimacy trilemma: Proposals for
institutional reform in the EU which target any of the three sources of le-
gitimacy tend to weaken another. Institutional changes operated on one
source of legitimacy can hardly avoid becoming a factor of stress on one
of the other sources. The quest for reforms to bestow greater legitimacy
for governance in the EU thus appears to be a zero-sum game: the multi-
dimensional problem of legitimacy may be reshuffled to a degree, but it
cannot be reduced in total. The constitutional choices can be described in
an idealtypical manner in the following three options to reform the insti-
tutional arrangement of the EU:
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1. „Input“-Legitimacy
A fully-fledged democratization of the European Governance System is
perhaps the most popular constitutional choice in order to gain more in-
put-legitimacy for European policy-making. The basic argument is very
simple: The more the citizens are involved in the decision-making process
and its control the more likely it is that they accept the resulting political
outcomes.
• According to the national blueprint, a European Union organized as a
(strongly decentralized) federal state with a two-chamber system repre-
senting the European people and the member states is most desirable
46.
It is also ‘textbook-friendly’ because it requires a democratization of
suprastatism including a strong role for the European Parliament in
decision-making: „The very important function of the European Par-
liament to establish links with the citizens will only develop substan-
tially when it gets more powers and when it becomes a major decision-
maker of the European Union“
47. As the main bearer of legitimacy in
the Union the Parliament’s increased powers in legislative functions
and democratic control of the executive activity of the Union would be
the most appropriate instrument for ensuring the legitimacy of the
European governance system as a whole. One of the most important
arguments for this reform option is that the principle of accountablity
should be fully respected in the process of Union policy formation.
The Commission as the future European government depends politi-
cally upon the will of the electorate channelled through the European
Parliament. According to this federal vision the EU should be a real
                                        
46 See for the Federal State option only Herman, F.: Second Report of the Institutio-
nal Comitee on the Constitution of the European Union, 2 February 1994, EP-Doc.
A 3-0064/94; Weidenfeld, Werner: Europa ‘96 - Unterwegs wohin? Die Europäi-
sche Union vor der Regierungskonferenz, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 1-
2/96, pp. 3-10; Wistrich, Ernest: The United States of Europe, London - New
York 1994.
47 Neunreither, Karl-Heinz: The Democratic Deficit of the European Union, in: Go-
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political community, within which central political issues are to be the
stuff of a Europe-wide discourse and will-formation, and the composed
European Parliament is to be the decisive factor in resolving conflicts
between the member states and the suprastate
48. Europe as a Federa-
tion seems to be a very attractive constitutional choice. But formal
measures to close the democracy gap at the European level with the
intention of strengthening the „input“-legitimacy of European govern-
ance might soon impair the Union’s efficiency and capacity for ac-
tion
49. There is a „general trade-off“
50 between efficiency and effec-
tiveness on the one hand and democratic participation and control on
the other: „(...) Expanding the legislative and budgetary powers of the
European Parliament could render European decision processes, al-
ready too complicated and time-consuming, even more cumber-
some“
51. It is also doubtful - as we have seen above - whether the EU
is capable of being a democracy at all, not even a federal one, for want
of the structural preconditions, on which democratic governance de-
pends. „In the absence of European media, European political parties,
and genuinely European processes of public-opinion formation, con-
stitutional reforms could not, by themselves, overcome the present
democratic deficit at the European level“
52. Democracy cannot simply
be installed by a constitutional act. It has to be linked to particular so-
cial preconditions which are only partially existent in the EU and
which cannot be created by political intervention
53. However, models
of federal democracy developed in the national context cannot be eas-
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49 Dahl, Robert A.: A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen
Partizipation, in: Political Science Quarterly 109 (1994), pp. 23-34.
50 Wessels, The Modern West European State and the European Union, ibid., p. 58.
51 Scharpf, Community and Autonomy: Multi-level Policy-Making in the European
Union, in: Journal of European Public Policy 1 (1994), pp. 219-242, p. 220.
52 Scharpf, Community and Autonomy, ibid., p. 220.
53 See only Kielmansegg, Integration und Demokratie, ibid., p. 58.The Trilemma of Legitimacy
21
ily transferred to the European Union. It is useless - as most of the
federalists do - to apply standard doctrines of parliamentary democracy
developed for nation-states to institutions of the EU in an unreflected
way
54. Such a political strategy would probably not lead to a more
democratic and legitimate EU because a European identity including a
certain ‘we-feeling’ is lacking
55. On the contrary, it could have coun-
terproductive effects with regard to output legitimacy and the indirect
democratic legitimation of European policy-making through the mem-
ber states and their parliaments. The latter could occur to the extent
that the strengthening of the European Parliament weakens the Council
of Ministers as the voice of the member states. As a result the public
would have to accept the continued loss of centres of power which
provide national identification and emotional links for some kind of a
„flickering gleam of a transnational community“
56. Therefore a too
strong parliamentary input-orientation could exacerbate the multidi-
mensional legitimacy problem of the Union.
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55 Hrbek, Rudolf: Federal Balance and the Problem of Democratic Legitimacy in the
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MODES OF GOVERNANCE (Example 1)
PREFERRED LONG-TERM INTEGRATION TREND
(Constitutional Choice)
Europe as a Federation
REFORM OPTION
Abolishing the democratic deficit by democratizing suprastatism
Two-Chamber-System
Commission as real government legitimised by European Parliament
SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY
Input: participation, political accountability, democratic control
Type of representation at the European level: more individual
BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF LEGITIMATE RULE
Cosmopolitan: Government by the People, Demos-Cracy
2. „Output“-Legitimacy
According to this concept, everything has to be done to strengthen the
efficiency and effectiveness of European policy-making. It is postulated
that the greater the capacity of the EU-Governance-System to achieve the
citizens’ goals and to solve their problems the more legitimate the system
will be. But institutional arrangements designed for greater efficiency tend
to encroach upon the standards of democracy that are common within the
Member States. This thesis can be demonstrated in two proposals.
It is often argued that the expansion of majoritarian decision-making in
the Council of Ministers would strengthen the output-legitimacy of Euro-The Trilemma of Legitimacy
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pean Governance, because it is more efficient than the current, predomi-
nantly conensual mode. But paradoxically the increase of majority-rule at
the European level would accentuate the democratic deficit in the multi-
level system. This is especially the case at the national level, because the
member state governments’ answerability to their national parliaments
loses some of its meaningfulness and efficacy. The parliaments of the
member state executives, which where in a minority position, are not able
to hold the representatives of other countries accountable for their voting
behavior in the Council. From a theoretical point of view it is not evident
that the boundaries within which a minority will accept as democratically
legitimate a majority decision could be European instead of national:
„(...) It can be argued plausibly that the electorate in most member states
accepts only grudgingly the notion that crucial areas of public life should
be governed by a decision process in which their national voice becomes a
minority that may be overridden by a majority of representatives from
other European countries“
57.
Some authors argue that multi-level governance in Europe could gain
more legitimacy when the EU developes into a kind of „regulatory
state“
58. The example which is frequently given is the ‘fourth branch of
government’ in the USA. The model of the US regulatory state allows the
correction of market failures in areas of social regulation. Corresponding
to this model, the European Union should concentrate on activities in
which it can hope to achieve greater efficiency than can the member
states, „whether that be because of the transborder character of the issues
to be dealt with or because states acting alone are likely to generate nega-
tive externalities for their partners“
59. This purpose allegedly is best
                                        
57 Weiler, After Maastricht, ibid., p. 23.
58 The most active theorist of the regulatory model at European level is Giandomenico
Majone: Independence versus Accountability? Non-Majoritarian Institutions and
Democratic Government in Europe, European University Institute Working Paper
SPS No. 93/4, Florence 1994; Majone, Giandomenico: Regulating Europe, London
- New York 1996.
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achieved by efficiency-oriented independent regulatory agencies which are
dominated by sectoral technical experts and functional organizations and
which have no political accountablity in a traditional sense of democratic
thinking. It is argued that the problem-solving style of decision-making of
independent regulatory bodies and other specialized agencies would be in
a better position than elected governers to satisfy the new regulatory de-
mands of the electorate
60. Evidently, delegating substantive powers to in-
dependent agencies tend to weaken the influence of parliaments - at both
the European and the national level. But this concept of legitimacy goes in
a different direction. It is emphasized that efficieny-oriented policy based
on expertise has no redistributive effects and also need not be democrati-
cally legitimated. The argument runs as follows: (...) the delegation of
important policy-making powers to independent institutions is democrati-
cally justified only in the sphere of efficiency issues, where reliance on
expertise and on a problem-solving style of decision-making is more im-
portant than reliance on direct political accountablity. Where redistribu-
tive concerns prevail, legitimacy can be ensured only by majoritarian
means“
61. In this view democratic control of European policy-making on
policy sectors which should be handled in an efficiency-oriented manner
could often even have counterproductive effects. Therefore also politically
motivated interference must be avoided.
The premises of this concept are very dubious. It is almost impossible to
de-politicise policy-making in a multinational setting through this static
differentiation into regulatory and redistributive issues because the former
could also have redistributive effects
62 which would provocate political
conflicts, i. e. among „haves“ (richer nations) and „have-nots“ (poorer
nations). It is simply inconceivable that these conflicts should be solved
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by independent regulatory authorities which lack political accountablity
and democratic control. Another negative implication of a pure efficiency-
oriented constitutional engineering can also be mentioned: Insisting exclu-
sively on the principle of efficiency and the exclusive insitutionalization of
this idea of rationality „could turn out to be a threat to the integration
process. The neglect of other criteria of rationality such as ‘autonomy’ or
‘democracy’ could lead to the formation of political movements against
integration which are stronger and more persistent than the one that ap-
peared during the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty“
63.
MODES OF GOVERNANCE (Example 2)
PREFERRED LONG-TERM INTEGRATION TREND
(Constitutional Choice)
Europe as a ‘regulatory state’ (technocracy)
REFORM OPTION
Abolishing the democratic deficit by depoliticising Euro-Politics
Institutionalization of independent regulatory agencies
SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY
Output: Efficiency and Effectiveness
Type of representation at the European level: more functional
BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF LEGITIMATE RULE
Technocratic-utilitarian: Government for the people
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3. „Social“ Legitimacy
According to this communitarian concept
64, the legitimacy of a political
system depends on the degree of social homogeneity and the existence of
a collective identity among citizens. The only communities which fulfil
these conditions are nation-states. It follows from the communitarian
principle of social legitimacy that the political order at the European level
must protect the communities to which the collective identities of the in-
dividuals are oriented and which possess the best social prerequisites for
stable democracy. Therefore the member states as the „Masters of the
Treaties“ („Herren der Verträge“) should play the most important role in
the multi-level game of European policy-making. This reform option
seems to be a step back because it tends to abandon suprastatism.
In order to protect the national autonomy of member states the Union re-
quires consensual interstate decision-making and/or a greater role for the
national parliaments in controlling European policy-making. At first sight,
a European Confederation based on intergovernmental co-operation would
have many advantages. The citizens in the member states have no prob-
lems in accepting the majority principle in their own community, and
their power to force governments and legislative majorities from office
for political reasons is not threatened. Therefore, national parliaments
should be the primary source of legitimacy in the EU. Instead of compen-
sating the lack of democratic empowerment and control of the national
executives by strengthening the European Parliament, it is favoured to
strengthen the role of national parliaments vis-à-vis national governments
in European politics
65. Common decisions in a confederation-like govern-
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ance system are only binding when they are completely ratified by each
member state in accordance with its own constitutional provisions, espe-
cially the approval of their parliaments
66. But the disadvantages outweigh
these benefits. Greater involvement of member state parliaments in Euro-
pean decision-making and control, or even a return to an intergovern-
mental state-system based on the principle of unanimity, would doubtless
be gained at the expense of efficiency in decision processes and hence of
problem solving ability. The deficits in achieving, implementing and con-
trolling comon decisions would reduce the effectiveness of common or
co-ordinated instruments
67. High degrees of national autonomy and Euro-
pean consociationalism can only be honored at the expense of system ca-
pacity and effective political decision-making
68. After the creation of a
European market the remaining of competencies at the European level is
essential. Majority voting in the Council and strong supranational institu-
tions like the Commission and the Court increase the efficiency and the
effectiveness of the EU in the enlightened self-interest of the member
states
69. „Insisting on the virtues of national democracy (...) risks to de-
fend an increasingly empty set of formal participation rules while the im-
pact of the European market dictates political choices“
70. Wessels rightly
points out that the return to a more intergovernmental mode of govern-
ance would even reinforce the de facto erosion of national constitutions
and institutions
71. In sum, renationalization cannot be the right answer to
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the challenges which the EU faces now and in future. To solve common
problems more effectively - and solving common problems is after all the
motivating force behind integration - majority decisions and supranational
authority at the European level must be given dependable recognition.
MODES OF GOVERNANCE (Example 3)
PREFERRED LONG-TERM INTEGRATION TREND (Constitutional
Choice)
Europe as a Confederation
REFORM OPTIONS
Abolishing the democratic deficit by abandoning suprastatism
Return to interstate cooperation based on consensual decision-making
Protection of national autonomy
Withdrawal from supranational authority
SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY
Social legitimacy:
Emphasizing the necessity of social underpinnings for governance
The nation-state as the only possible framework for democracy
Type of representation at the European level: more executive
BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF LEGITMATE RULE
Communitarian: ethnos-cracy, government of the peopleThe Trilemma of Legitimacy
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V. Conclusions
So what can be done? In view of this legitimacy trilemma, academics and
politicians should dispense with utopian („Europe as a Federation“), mo-
nistic („Europe as a Technocracy“) and ‘old-fashioned’ („Europe as a
Confederation“) constitutional choices in their search for solutions of the
EU’s multidimensional legitimacy problem. Despite several attempts for
far-reaching institutional reforms, the EU-governance system is arguably
likely to persist in its present structures for a foreseeable future, and is
unlikely to develop into a federal state or to disintegrate into a classic in-
ternational organization
72. It is, therefore, better to search for a „down-to-
earth“ and „non-metaphysical“ piecemeal approach in the tradition of
Karl Popper
73. Reform policies should be formulated in small, clearly
stated stages so that their premises can be tested and their implications are
easy to grasp. This approach could show that it might be better to pre-
serve the existing democratic deficit instead of abolishing it either by
abandoning suprastatism or by democratizing suprastatism. Against this
background, the concept of „autonomy compatible co-ordination“
74 is a
useful „preservationist“
75 option. In this idea the European multi-level
system as a whole is to be rendered compatible both with the demands for
autonomy put by the member states and with practical advantages arising
from transnational problem-solving at the European level: „On the one
hand, the limited policy-making capacities of the EU ought to be used
sparingly, and only for issues that need to be settled on the European
level. On the other hand, an effort should be made to restrict as much as
possible the negative repercussions of European integration on the prob-
lem-solving capacities of national politics“
76. To avoid the situation that
                                        
72 Jachtenfuchs, Democracy and Governance, ibid., p. 38.
73 Popper, Karl R.: The Open Society and its Enemies, London 1945.
74 Scharpf, Community and Autonomy, ibid.; p. 221 f.
75 Gustavsson, Double Assymetrie as Normative Challenge, ibid., p. 115.
76 Scharpf, Community and Autonomy, ibid., p. 222.Marcus Höreth
30
politics at the European level cannot act while politics at the national level
has lost its effectiveness, the primary maxim for constitutional engineer-
ing must be employing „the limited possibilities of action at both levels,
national and European, in such a way that the existing but limited oppor-
tunities for effective policy at both levels are exploited and predictable
frustrations sidestepped“
77. The question is, of course, how this piece-
meal idea of combining respect for the autonomy of member states with a
sense of the need for European-level regulation can be institutionalized.
Nevertheless it may be taken for granted, that current and future research
concerning the legitimation of the European multi-level system should
concentrate on relatively modest questions like this one - otherwise schol-
ars will develop only utopian, monistic or old-fashioned blueprints, which
do not fit the multidimensional legitimacy problem of European govern-
ance at all.
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